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Abstract 
The role of individuals has shifted. In less than 30 years, individuals have transcended their 
role as passive “data subjects” to become actively involved in the creation, distribution and 
consumption of personal data. Unless an exemption or derogation applies, individuals are – 
at least in theory – subject to data protection law. This hypothesis was confirmed early on by 
the Lindqvist ruling and more recently in Ryneš. The aim of this paper is to analyse whether it 
is still possible to reconcile the “personal use exemption” of article 3(2) Directive 95/46 with 
the widespread use of technologies by individuals. Using online social networks, drones and 
Google Glass as use cases, this paper will explore how the personal use exemption might be 
shaped in order to preserve individuals’ ability to use new technologies freely, while still 
protecting the privacy interests of others. 
Keywords: data protection, roles and responsibilities, personal use, social media, drones, 
Google Glass 
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1. The evolving role of the individual2  
 
We use information and communication technologies every day. Mobile devices tell 
us where to eat, who to meet and how to get there. We share pictures, post videos and 
tweet reviews. We google everything and everyone. We are non-stop creators, publishers 
and consumers of data.3  
In a just few years, the introductory paragraph to this paper will be hopelessly dated. 
“We used to worry about stuff people posted on Facebook” they’ll say. Or that running a 
name search on Google “is just sooo 2014”. “Today we worry about seamless connectivity 
between personal and environmental sensors, real-time use of facial recognition and other 
forms of augmented reality”. Celebrated authors such as David Brin4 and Jonathan Zittrain5 
have been alluding to such scenarios for years. While certain prophecies are yet to be 
fulfilled, this much is clear: the role of individuals has shifted. In less than 30 years, 
individuals have transcended their role as passive “data subjects” to become actively 
involved in the creation, distribution and consumption of personal data.6 
Data protection laws have traditionally targeted governmental and commercial 
institutions as the main subjects of regulation.7 The reason is simple: computer usage 
started out as a prerogative of large companies, governments, and universities.8 As a result, 
the first generation of data protection laws was geared towards data usage by resourceful 
public and private sector organizations.9 Although they have been revised several times 
                                                          
2 Title inspired by the Agenda of the 2010 OECD Conference, “The Evolving Role of the Individual in Privacy 
Protection: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, Jerusalem, 25-26 October 2010, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/46252465.pdf (last accessed 17 January 2015).  
3 See also O. Tene, “Privacy: The new generations”, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 21-25. 
4 See e.g. D. Brin, The Transparent Society, Basic Books, Lexington, 1998, p. 4-10.  
5 J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet— And How to Stop It, 2008, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 
342 p, accessible at http://futureoftheinternet.org/files/2013/06/ZittrainTheFutureoftheInternet.pdf (last 
accessed 4 February 2015). 
6 OECD, Supplementary explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the Council concerning 
guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, 2013, Paris, p. 32, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf (last accessed 12 January 
2015).   
7 J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet— And How to Stop It, o.c., p. 200. 
8 See e.g. J. Bing, “Data protection in a time of changes”, in W.F. Korthals Altes a.o. (eds.), Information Law 
Towards the 21st Century, 1992, Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, p. 247-248. For discussion of 
the availability and main forms of usage of computer systems in the 1970’s see Commission des Communautés 
Européens, “Systèmes à grande puissance de traitement automatique de l'information. Besoins et applications 
dans la Communauté européenne et au Royaume-Uni vers les années soixante-dix”, Études, Série Industrie, n° 
6, 1971, p. 39-57.  
9 See also V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, in P.E. Agre and 
M. Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, 1998, London, MIT Press, p. 223 and C. 
Reed, ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business Models in IT Regulation’, Journal of 
Information Law and Technology 2007, vol. 2, paragraph 33, available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2007_2/reed/reed.pdf  (last accessed 17 January 2014). 
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since, it seems difficult to fully dispense with certain implicit assumptions.10 Meanwhile, 
advances in information and communication technologies have fundamentally altered the 
context in which data protection laws are to be applied. The new reality is at odds with the 
framing of roles and responsibilities in many legal instruments, including Data Protection 
Directive 95/46.11  
Under Directive 95/46, individuals are viewed mainly as the “beneficiaries” of 
protection. If an individual decides to process data relating to others, however, he or she will 
be considered a “controller” rather than a “data subject”.12 Unless an exemption or 
derogation applies, he or she will – at least in theory – be subject to the full panoply of data 
protection norms. This hypothesis was confirmed early on by the Lindqvist13 ruling and more 
recently in Ryneš14. Central to both cases was the question of whether the processing 
activities of an individual fell within the scope of article 3(2) of Directive 95/46, which 
exempts processing “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity”. The answer, in both instances, was a resounding “no”. For some time now, scholars 
have been asking whether the “all or nothing” approach of article 3(2) makes sense.15 Is data 
protection really the right way right to think about church newsletters or home security 
systems? Should we perhaps revise the scope article 3(2) so that “non-commercial” activities 
fall outside the scope of data protection law?16  
Data protection advocates are cautious when it comes to expanding the notion of 
“personal use”. For all its benefits, the widespread availability of ICTs also enables 
individuals to inflict considerable privacy harms. Outing a sexual preference17, broadcasting a 
traumatic experience18, public shaming19 or posting “revenge porn”20 are all just a few clicks 
                                                          
10 See also M. Birnhack, ‘Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law’, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 
2012, Vol. 24, p. 64 et seq. and C. Reed, ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business Models in 
IT Regulation’, l.c., in particular paragraphs 26 through 39. 
11 See also OECD, ‘The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines’, l.c., p. 27. 
12 The scope of this paper does not include individuals who are acting on behalf of a group or organisation. In 
such cases, it is the group or organisation which will considered the “controller”, whereas the individual making 
the decision will generally be viewed simply as its agent.  
13 European Court of Justice, Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, 6 November 2003, available at www.curia.eu.. 
14 Court of Justice of the European Union, František Ryneš v. Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, C‑212/13, 11 
December 2014, accessible at www.curia.eu. 
15 See in particular R. Wong and J. Savirimuthu, “All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Article 
3(2) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet”, 25 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 2008, 241-266; B. 
Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data protection 
regulations?’, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS) 2009, p. 75-76 and N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, 
‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers’, Computer Law 
Review International (Cri) 2010, Vol. 4, 104 et seq. 
16 See e.g. D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social 
Networking’, International Law & Management Review 2010, Vol. 6, 150.  
17 See e.g. High Court of Justice, Applause Store Productions Limited and Matthew Firsht v. Grant Raphael, 24 
July 2008, [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB), accessible at www.bailii.org.  
18 See e.g. Corte di Cassazione, sez. III Penale, sentenza 17 dicembre 2013 – deposit ail 3 febbraio 2014, 
sentenza n. 5107/14, accessible at available at www.dirittoegiustizia.it  
19 High Court of Justice, Stephen Robins and Gabbitas Robins v. Rick Kordowski and Tim Smee, 22 July 2011, 
[2011] EWHC 1912 (QB), accessible at www.bailii.org.  
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away. While traditional civil law remedies (e.g., defamation, breach of confidence, right to 
control the use of one’s image, misuse of private information) may offer a solution, certain 
remedies show limitations when applied to the online context.21 Data protection laws could 
provide an important legal backstop in such cases. At the same time, the application of data 
protection laws to individuals acting in a private capacity also raises questions. Should we 
subject private individuals to the same regulatory logic as organisations? Can we expect 
average citizens to familiarize themselves with the intricacies of data protection law? Do the 
rules even make sense when applied to the context of social interaction?   
The central thesis of this paper is that the time has come to broaden the personal use 
exemption. It will start by tracing the legislative history of article 3(2) and its subsequent 
interpretation by the European Court of Justice. Next, it will contrast the current approach to 
the ratio legis of Directive 95/46 as a whole, which was designed to regulate organisations 
rather than individuals. The paper will go on to analyse several existing proposals to revise 
the personal use exemption. Using three use cases, the paper will then evaluate whether the 
current proposals adequately address the evolving role of individuals. Two criteria will serve 
as guiding principles during the evaluation, namely the principle of legal certainty and 
principle of proportionality.22 There is no special justification for employing these criteria, 
other than that they are both general principles of EU law. Other general principles of EU law 
(such as the principles of subsidiarity or fairness) may also be relevant, but fall outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
20 See http://www.endrevengeporn.org/.  
21 See e.g. D. Erdos, ‘Filling Defamation’s Gaps: Data Protection and the Right to Reputation’, Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper 2013, No. 69, available at 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/245805/OA1491_Reputation%20and%20Data%20P
rotection%20Article_Final_title.pdf?sequence=4 (last accessed 17 January 2015). 
22 Legal certainty requires laws to be sufficiently precise so as to allow individuals to reasonably foresee its 
consequences See e.g. J.R. Maxeiner, “Legal certainty: a European alternative to American legal 
indeterminacy?”, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 2007, Vol.15(2), p. 549. Proportionality, 
on the other hand, requires that laws are suitable, necessary and non-excessive. See e.g. T.-I. Harbo, “The 
function of the proportionality principle in EU law”, European Law Journal 2010, Vol.16(2), p. 165. 
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2. The exemption for “purely personal” or “household” activity  
 
2.1 Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 
The second indent of article 3(2) provides that Directive 95/46 shall not apply to the 
processing of personal data carried out  
“by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity”.  
a. Legislative history 
The personal use exemption was not an original creation of the drafters of Directive 
95/46. The 1978 French Data Protection Act had already exempted “non-automated or 
mechanized” processing if it was intended purely for personal use.23 The 1984 UK Data 
Protection Act exempted individuals if the processing “concerned only the management of 
his personal, family or household affairs” or if the data were held “for recreational 
purposes”.24 The European Commission’s proposal contained similar language, by providing 
that the Directive would not apply to “files held by an individual solely for private and 
personal purposes”.25 Shortly after submission, the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection proposed modifying the text to read as follows: 
“This Directive shall not apply to files held by an individual for the purpose of purely 
personal or household activities”26  
                                                          
23 A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC. A comparative analysis of the privacy 
statutes of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands and their impact 
on the private sector, Kluwer, Deventer, Computer/Law Series n° 6, 1990, p. 82. The exemption was said to 
encompass ‘non-professional’ files, which are ‘not related to any activity which places those that hold them in 
an “organisational” relationship [rapport organique] with third parties’ (A. Holleaux, ‘La loi du 6 Janvier 1978 
sur l’informatique et les libertés (I)’, La Revue Administrative 1978, Vol. 31, n° 181, p. 165). Automated 
processing of personal data by individuals would, strictly speaking, fall within the remit of the Act, even if it 
were carried out for a purely private purpose. (N. Lenoir, ‘La loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 et la Commission 
national de l’informatique et des liberté: Éléments pour un premier bilan de cinq années d’activité, La Revue 
adminstrative 1983, Vol. 36, no. 215, p. 465).  
24 Section 33(1)) of Data Protection Act, 1984 c. 35. A copy scanned copy of the original 1984 UK Data 
Protection Act is accessible at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/35/pdfs/ukpga_19840035_en.pdf. 
See also House of Lords (HL) Debates (Deb), 10 March 1983, vol. 440 c. 373. Strictly speaking, data held for 
private purposes was only partially exempted from the 1984 Data protection act (see section 33(1). In principle, 
the users of these data still needed to comply with the general principles of data protection contained in 
Section 1 of the act. However, in practice there was a total exemption as the principles were only enforceable 
against registered data users. (A.C.M. Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC, o.c., p. 118 
footnote 21.)  
25 Commission of the European Communities, “Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the processing of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data”, COM(90) 314 final, SYN 287, 13 September 1990, p. 
51. 
26 Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, “Amendments to the draft opinion 
of the Commission proposal for a Council directive on the protection of individuals in relation to the processing 
of personal data (Com(90) 314 final – C3-323/90 – SYN 287”, 10 May 1991, amendment n° 23.  
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Wordsmithing aside, the personal use exemption would remain essentially unchanged 
throughout the remainder of the legislative process. Recital (12) would add two examples of 
personal or household activities, namely “correspondence and the holding of records of 
addresses.”27 
 
b. Ratio legis 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Commission proposal offered the 
following rationale for article 3(2): 
“Paragraph 2 provides for exceptions where invasions of privacy are unlikely to occur […] 
because the data are used for private purposes only, as is the case in with a personal 
electronic diary […]”.28 
Similar risk-based considerations were present in paragraph 3(b) of the 1980 OECD Privacy 
Guidelines. Paragraph 3(b) stated that the Guidelines should not be interpreted as 
preventing “the exclusion from the application of the Guidelines of personal data which 
obviously do not contain any risk to privacy and individual liberties”. Its accompanying 
Memorandum made clear that “the risks as expressed in Paragraph 2 of the Guidelines are 
intended to exclude data collections of an obviously innocent nature (e.g. personal 
notebooks)”.29  
The legislative history of Directive 95/46 offers little further guidance. The terms 
“purely” and “exclusively” clearly indicate that article 3(2) was to be construed narrowly. No 
standard was provided, however, to determine what might or might not constitute a 
“personal” or “household” activity.30 As a result, it was up to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) to clarify the scope of the personal use exemption.  
 
2.2 Lindqvist 
Mrs. Lindqvist, who worked as a catechist in a local parish, had set up a number of 
web pages. The pages included information about several other parishioners, who were 
referenced either by their full names or merely by their first names. In many cases telephone 
numbers were listed. The pages also described, “in a mildly humorous manner” the jobs held 
by the parishioners and their hobbies. Of one parishioner it was stated that she had injured 
                                                          
27 Recital (12) Directive 95/56 (emphasis added) 
28 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the processing of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data, l.c., p. 21.  
29 OECD, Explanatory Memorandum to the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, paragraph 43. Article 9(3) of Convention 108 also recognized the possibility for exemptions in 
cases where there was “no risk of an infringement of the privacy of the data subjects”, but only in relation to 
statistics or scientific research. 
30 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 72. 
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her foot and was working half-time for medical reasons. Mrs. Lindqvist had not obtained the 
consent of the individuals concerned. She had also failed to notify the data protection 
authority. She was subsequently prosecuted for violation of the Swedish law on personal 
data.31  
As to the question of whether the activities of Mrs. Lindqvist were covered by the 
exception for personal use, the ECJ replied that the exemption must be interpreted as 
“relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life 
of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data 
consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an 
indefinite number of people”.32  
The ECJ thus put forth two criteria to determine whether the personal use exemption 
applies. In the first place the processing activity must be carried out “in the course of private 
and family life”. Secondly, the exemption shall not apply where data are published on the 
internet and made accessible to an “indefinite number of people”.   
The first component of the Lindqvist test is perhaps the most striking. Whereas 
article 3(2) of the Directive exempts data processing in the context of “purely personal or 
household” activities, the ECJ referred to activities carried out “in the course of private or 
family life”. The latter wording is nowhere to be found in the text of Directive 95/46. The 
word choice instead seems to have been inspired by the language of article 7 of the EU 
Charter and/or article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.33 The allusion to this 
terminology appears to have been intentional. If so, it arguably has important ramifications 
for the scope of the personal use exemption. It has long been established that the protection 
of “private life” under article 8 ECHR is not restricted to that which has historically been 
dubbed “the private sphere”. Rather, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly 
underlined that it also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right 
to establish and develop relationships with others.34  
The second part of the Lindqvist test precludes its application in cases where data are 
made available to an “indefinite” number of people, yet does not specify a limit or threshold. 
The second part of the Lindqvist test is arguably most problematic35, as will be made evident 
by the use cases presented in section 5.36   
                                                          
31 European Court of Justice, Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, at paragraphs 12-15. 
32  European Court of Justice, Bodil Lindqvist, at paragraph 47 (emphasis added). 
33 Article 8(1) ECHR provides that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence”. Article 7 of the EU Charter provides that “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications.”  
34 See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 25 September 2001, application 
no. 44787/98 at 56 and European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, application 
no. 13710/88, at 29. 
35 See also R. Wong and J. Savirimuthu, “All or Nothing: This is the Question? The Application of Article 3(2) 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC to the Internet”, p. 246 (“The ECJ's decision clarifies the extent to which 
individuals may be able to benefit from Article 3(2), when placing personal information on the Internet, 
however, it raises several questions. If it is accepted that limiting access of an individual's Web page to family 
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2.3 Ryneš 
Ryneš concerned the use of video surveillance for home security purposes. For a 
number of years, Mr. Ryneš had been plagued by attacks by unknown persons. The windows 
of the family home had been broken on several occasions.37 In order to protect his family 
and home, Mr. Ryneš decided to install a camera system. It consisted of one fixed camera 
which monitored the entrance to his home, as well as the public footpath and the entrance 
to the house opposite.38 Almost immediately, the camera system served its purpose. On the 
second night after its installation, one of the windows of Mr. Ryneš’s home was broken by a 
shot from a catapult.39 The video recording made it possible to identify two suspects, which 
eventually led to criminal proceedings.40  
When petitioned by one of suspects, the Czech Data Protection Authority (DPA) held 
that Mr. Ryneš’s camera system violated the Czech data protection act.41 The main reasons 
were that (1) the camera system had captured, without consent of the individuals 
concerned, the images of people moving along the street or entering the house opposite; (2) 
Mr. Ryneš had failed to provide the individuals concerned any information regarding the 
processing of their personal data; and (3) Mr. Ryneš had failed to report the camera system 
to the DPA.42 Further legal proceedings ensued, resulting in a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ. Could the processing carried out by Mr. Ryneš be classified as the 
processing of personal data “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity”? 
The ECJ concluded that Mr. Ryneš’s processing activities did not fall within the remit 
of article 3(2). 43 It reasoned that  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
members will be exempt from Article 3(2) DPD, such that the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC does not 
apply, where does one draw the line for individuals whose web pages may extend beyond family members?”); E. 
C. Harris, “Personal Data Privacy Tradeoffs and How a Swedish Church Lady, Austrian Public Radio Employees, 
and Transatlantic Air Carriers Show That Europe Does Not Have All the Answers”, 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2007, p. 
787 and F.J. Garcia, “Bodil Lindqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Union’s Data Protection 
Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators”, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 2005, p. 1232 et 
seq. 
36 Cf. infra; section 5.1. 
37 Court of Justice of the European Union, František Ryneš v. Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, 11 December 
2014, Case C-212/13, at paragraph 14. 
38 Ibid, at paragraph 13. The ECJ noted that the recording capabilities of the camera system were limited in 
several respects: “[t]he system allowed only a visual recording, which was stored on recording equipment in the 
form of a continuous loop, that is to say, on a hard disk drive. As soon as it reached full capacity, the device 
would record over the existing recording, erasing the old material. No monitor was installed on the recording 
equipment, so the images could not be studied in real time. Only Mr Ryneš had direct access to the system and 
the data.”(Id.) 
39 Ibid, at paragraph 15. 
40 Ibid, at paragraph 15. 
41 Ibid, at paragraph 16. 
42 Ibid, at paragraph 16. 
43 Ibid, at paragraph 35. 
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“To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the 
private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be 
regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity for the 
purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.”44 
In reaching its conclusion, the ECJ also took into account that (a) the objective of 
Directive 95/46 is to ensure a high level of protection45; (b) any derogations and limitations 
must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary46; and (c) the very wording of article 3(2) 
(“purely”) also suggests it should be narrowly construed47.   
The ECJ recognized that the mere fact that the processing “incidentally” concerns the 
private life of other persons does not necessarily preclude application of article 3(2).48 After 
all, recital (12) of the Directive mentions “correspondence and the holding of records of 
addresses” as examples. By definition, such processing activities “incidentally concern” the 
private life of other persons. The continuous monitoring of a public space, however, is 
something different. If a camera is directed “outwards from the private setting”, it regularly 
affects individuals with whom the controller has no personal or household relationship.  
The Ryneš Court concluded its reasoning by considering the practical implications of 
its ruling. Although it was not asked to pronounce itself on the legality of Mr. Ryneš’s video 
surveillance system, it did note that:  
“[T]he application of Directive 95/46 makes it possible, where appropriate, to take 
into account — in accordance, in particular, with Articles 7(f), 11(2), and 13(1)(d) and 
(g) of that directive — legitimate interests pursued by the controller, such as the 
protection of the property, health and life of his family and himself, as in the case in 
the main proceedings.”49 
In other words: even if the personal use exemption does not apply, the applicability 
of the requirements of Directive 95/46 does not by itself render a home security system 
unlawful.50 Directive 95/46 recognizes the “legitimate interest” 51 of the controller as a 
possible justification for the processing of personal data (in other words: consent is not 
necessarily required). The Directive also allows Member States to exempt controllers from 
                                                          
44 Ibid, at paragraph 33. 
45 Ibid, at paragraph 27 
46 Ibid, at paragraph 28-29. 
47 Ibid, at paragraph 30. 
48 Ibid, at paragraph 32. 
49 Ibid, paragraph 34. 
50 Advocate-General Jääskinen in fact concluded that the processing at issue would be lawful under Directive 
95/46 (see Opinion of Advocate-General Jääskinen, František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, Case 
C‑212/13, 10 July 2014, at paragraphs 63 et seq. See also pdpEcho, “CJEU: CCTV camera in family home falls 
under the Data protection directive, but it is in principle lawful”, 11 December 2014, accessible at 
http://pdpecho.com/2014/12/11/cjeu-cctv-camera-in-family-home-falls-under-the-data-protection-directive-
but-it-is-in-principle-lawful/ (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
51 See article 7(f) Directive 95/46. 
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their duty to inform in cases where “the provision of such information proves impossible or 
would involve a disproportionate effort”. 52  Finally, article 13(1) allows for additional 
derogations (a.o. to the principles of data quality and data subject rights) where such 
measures are necessary (a) for the prevention or detection of criminal offences53 or (b) to 
protect the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others54. 
The conceptual approach outlined by the Ryneš Court suggests that Directive 95/46 
can (and should) be implemented in such a way that it does not unduly restrict individuals’ 
ability to pursue a legitimate objective. It is up to the Member States, however, to actually 
provide for appropriate derogations.55 A significant number of Member States have already 
introduced specific rules governing the use of CCTV, including by private individuals.56 
Beyond CCTV, however, it seems only few States have introduced specific derogations.57  
Without ruling out the possibility such derogations may still be introduced, it is worth 
reflecting whether data protection requirements should be applied to private individuals. 
The next section will contrast the conceptual approach of the ECJ in Ryneš to the ratio legis 
of Directive 95/46 as a whole, which was designed to regulate organisations rather than 
individuals.   
                                                          
52 See article 11(2) Directive 95/46. 
53 Article 13(1)d Directive 95/46. 
54 Article 13(1)g Directive 95/46. 
55 The latest draft of the proposed Data Protection Regulation likewise leaves the matter to be addressed by 
the Member States. Article 21 of the “compromise text” of the European Parliament allows for derogations 
similar to article 13. See European Parliament, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 
2012/0011(COD)) Compromise amendments on Articles 1-29, 7 October 2013, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_01-
29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf (last accessed 16 March 2015). The compromise text does not allow, however, 
to introduce exemptions to e.g., data quality principles (article 5), the documentation requirement (article 28), 
data breach notifications (article 31) or international transfers (articles 40 et seq).  
56  See D. Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Study Contract 
ETD/2001/B5-3001/A/49, 2002, 135 et seq., accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287667  
57 Idem.  
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3. Directive 95/46 is geared towards organizations 
 
Data protection laws originally emerged as a response to concerns regarding the increased 
use of computing applications by public and private sector organisations.58 Even though 
Directive 95/46 was enacted more than 20 years after the first data protection laws 
appeared, many of its requirements still reveal an organisational mind set. 59  The 
organisational mind set of Directive 95/46 is evident in both the language and substance of 
its provisions. 
3.1 A focus on data management  
A key provision of Directive 95/46 is article 6, which defines “principles relating to 
data quality”. As currently defined, these principles contain principles of “good data 
management”, rather than guidelines for data use by private individuals. For example, article 
6(1) specifies that personal data must be: 
 collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed 
in a way incompatible with those purposes; 
 adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed; 
 accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to 
the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified; 
 kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed.” 
The Directive’s focus on data management is not surprising if one considers the 
genealogy of European data protection law. The first generation of data protection laws 
were motivated – at least in part – by a desire to improve the integrity of organizational 
                                                          
58 See V. Mayer-Schönberger, “Generational Development of Data Protection in Europe”, in P.E. Agre and M. 
Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, 1998, London, MIT Press, p. 221; F.W. Hondius, 
Emerging data protection in Europe, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1975,, p. 7; P. De Hert 
and S. Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and transparency of 
power”, in E. Claes, A. Duff and S. Gutwirth (eds.), Privacy and the Criminal Law, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2006, 
p. 77. 
59 See also See also C. Reed, ‘The Law of Unintended Consequences - Embedded Business Models in IT 
Regulation’, l.c., paragraph 36 et seq. 
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decision-making.60 As computers made it easier to store information for prolonged periods 
of time, the risk of harms resulting from the reliance upon erroneous data was expected to 
increase.61 Several data protection requirements can be seen as efforts to “sanitize the 
informational environment”62; in particular those provisions which impose limits upon the 
collection and storage of information, or provisions which require that recorded information 
be kept up-to-date or limit the use of such data to a particular context.63 
3.2 Procedural nature 
A second indication that Directive 95/46 is geared towards organizations is the 
procedural nature of many of its safeguards.64 The drafters of the first data protection laws 
feared that the use of computing technologies would render organizational decision-making 
increasingly opaque.65 People’s wellbeing would depend on the outcome of obscure data 
processing practices, without any ability to contest them (or even being aware of them).66 As 
a result, data protection laws came to introduce a set of procedural safeguards designed to 
act as “checks” against potential misuse of personal data.67 Specifically, safeguards were 
designed to promote transparency of processing and the accountability of organizations.68 
The duty to inform, the right of access and the creation of dedicated administrative 
oversight are clear examples. The argument that there is a need for similar “checks” against 
misuse of personal data by private individuals is far less compelling, as the power 
relationships between private individuals are fundamentally different from those between 
individuals and organizations.69 Moreover, applying the procedural mechanisms of Directive 
95/46 to individuals also raises questions of proportionality. As Zittrain observes: 
                                                          
60 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1992, p. 44; L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and 
Limits, 2002, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, Information Law Series,  p. 105 et seq.. 
61 C.J. Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 35. 
See e.g. A.R. Miller, “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an 
Information-Oriented Society”, l.c., p. 1114. 
62 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 137. 
63 Id.  
64 See P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and 
transparency of power”, in, Privacy and the Criminal Law, ed. E. Claes, A. Duff and S. Gutwirth 
(Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), p. 76 et seq. 
65 L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 103 and 107; C.J. 
Bennet, Regulating privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, o.c., p. 19 and 
29; J. A. Cannataci, o.c., p. 60 and 64. 
66 See also L.A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits, o.c., p. 94-95.  
67 See also S. Rodotà, “Data Protection – Some problems for Newcomers”, in Council of Europe, Legislation and 
Data Protection. Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems relating to the development and application 
of legislation on data protection, 1983, Rome, Camera dei Deputati, p. 188.. 
68 See also J. Alhadeff, B. Van Alsenoy and J. Dumortier, ‘The accountability principle in data protection 
regulation: origin, development and future directions’, in D. Guagnin, L. Hempel, C. Ilten a.o. (eds.), Managing 
Privacy through Accountability, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills (UK), 2012, p. 49-82 
69 OECD, Supplementary explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the Council concerning 
guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, o.c., p. 32. See also J. 
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“It is one thing to ask a corporation to disclose the personal data and records it 
maintains; it is far more intrusive to demand such a thing of private citizens. Such 
disclosure may itself constitute an intrusive search upon the citizen maintaining the 
records.”70  
3.3 Resource constraints 
Compliance with Directive 95/46/EC requires expertise and resources which are 
typically only available to organizations.71 For example, ensuring confidentiality and security 
of processing requires people trained in IT security. The duty to notify supervisory 
authorities or to draft contracts implies access to legal counsel. While a single individual may 
have the skills and resources to perform each of these functions, it seems more realistic that 
they would be observed by organizational departments or outside contractors. In other 
words: a mismatch exists between the legal obligations of “controllers” and social practices 
of individuals. Not only does it appear impractical to apply several of the Directive’s 
provisions to private individuals, it would also be excessively burdensome and unrealistic.72  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Zittrain, o.c., p. 216 (“There is a quantum difference between a police officer and the little old lady (or other 
tourist or private citizen) videotaping or photographing a public event.”)  
70 J. Zittrain, o.c., p. 222. 
71 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 104. 
72 Ibid, p. 104 et seq. and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the 
Challenges Facing Social Networking’, 131 et seq. and p. 149. See also See also J. Zittrain, o.c., 221 (“[…] the 
sorts of administrative burdens we can reasonably place on established firms exceed those we can place on 
individuals--at some point, the burden of compliance becomes so great that the administrative burdens are 
tantamount to an outright ban.” 
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4. Towards a more balanced approach? 
Policymakers have not been immune to the issues highlighted in the previous 
section. During the past five years, three of the main international instruments of data 
protection regulation have been subject to review. This section will analyse how two of 
these instruments have tried to address the evolving role of individuals. 
4.1 The Revised OECD Privacy Guidelines 
Preparations for the review of the OECD Privacy Guidelines began in 2010, in the 
context of the Guidelines’ 30th anniversary.73 As part of the process, the OECD organized a 
thematic event dedicated to the “evolving role of the individual”.74 In a subsequent report, it 
was highlighted that 
“The concept of data controller […] did not necessarily contemplate the possibility of 
individuals acting in a manner similar to data controllers with respect to the personal 
data of others, a development that has been triggered by the emergence of Web 2.0. 
[…] Given the key role that individuals play in transmitting personal data […] further 
consideration may need to be given to their role in privacy protection frameworks.’75 
In 2011, the OECD’s Working Party for Information Security and Privacy formed a 
Volunteer Group of Privacy Experts (“Expert Group”).76 In the end, the Expert Group was 
unable to reach a consensus on how to address the evolving role of individuals. Certain 
members felt it would be appropriate to address this issue within the revised Guidelines. 
Others felt quite strongly that the Guidelines themselves should not address the practices of 
individuals. In the end, it was decided to merely highlight the issue in the Supplemental 
Explanatory Memorandum, which provides: 
“Over the past few years, individuals have […] become actively involved in creating, 
posting and sharing personal data about themselves, friends, relatives and others, 
over a vast array of information outlets including social networking services […]. 
When discussing this change, it was recognised that not every actor should 
necessarily be regulated in the same way. For example, individuals acting in the 
                                                          
73 OECD, Supplementary explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the Council concerning 
guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data,  o.c., p. 11.  
74 See e.g. OECD, ‘The Evolving Role of the Individual in Privacy Protection: 30 Years after the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines’, International Convention Center, Jerusalem, Israel, 25-26 October 2010, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46252465.pdf (last accessed 24 February). 
75 OECD, “The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years After the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, OECD Digital Economy 
Papers 2011, No. 176, OECD Publishing, p. 27-28, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgf09z90c31-en (last 
accessed 8 February 2015).  
76 OECD, Terms of Reference for the Review of the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Paris, 2011, DSTI/ICCP/REG(2011)4/FINAL, p. 6, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/48975226.pdf. The Expert Group focused on three main themes, namely: 
(1) the roles and responsibilities of key actors; (2) geographic restrictions on transborder data flows; and (3) 
proactive implementation and enforcement. (Ibid, 11). 
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context of their private lives are generally perceived to fall outside the remit of the 
Guidelines, as relationships among individuals are usually fundamentally different 
from those between individuals and organisations. Non-legislative measures, 
including education and awareness raising, were considered more appropriate to 
address the privacy risks associated with the activities of individuals. Where an 
individual does cause damage to the privacy interests of others, tort or civil law may 
offer a possible remedy, but other measures may need to be considered as well.”77 
4.2 The Draft Regulation 
a. Commission Proposal  
In January 2012, the European Commission outlined its proposals for reforming the 
1995 Data Protection Directive.78 The accompanying draft Regulation79 did not propose 
significant changes to the scope the personal use exemption. Article 2(2)d provided that the 
Regulation was not to apply to the processing of personal data 
“by a natural person without any gainful interest in the course of its own exclusively 
personal or household activity” 
Other than the addition of the words “without any gainful interest”, the 
Commission’s proposal essentially left the language of article 3(2) untouched. Draft recital 
(15) specified that  
“This Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person, 
which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding 
of addresses, and without any gainful interest and thus without any connection with a 
professional or commercial activity”. 
 
b. Statement by the Article 29 Working Party  
In February of 2013, the Article 29 Working Party issued a Statement on the “current 
discussions” surrounding the data protection reform. One of the annexes accompanying the 
                                                          
77 OECD, Supplementary explanatory memorandum to the revised recommendation of the Council concerning 
guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, o.c., p. 32. 
78 European Commission, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World – A European Data Protection Framework 
for the 21st Century, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Affairs Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2012) 9 final, 25 
January 2012, accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0009&from=en (last accessed 8 February 2015). 
79 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, 2012/0011 (COD), 25 January 2012, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last accessed 8 
February 2015). 
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Statement concerned the future of the personal use exemption.80 In the Statement, the 
Working Party considered that  
“the current Directive’s approach to personal or household processing has an 
unrealistically narrow scope that no longer reflects individuals’ capacity to process 
data for personal and household activities and has therefore become 
anachronistic.”81 
As an alternative approach, the Working Party proposed using the following five criteria to 
determine whether or not the personal use exemption applies:82  
(1) Publicity: is the data disseminated to an indefinite number of persons or to a 
limited community of friends, family members or acquaintances? 
(2) Data subjects involved is the data about individuals who have a personal or 
household relationship with the person posting it? 
(3) Scale and frequency: does the scale and frequency of the processing suggest a 
professional or full-time activity? 
(4) Concerted action: is the individual acting alone or is there evidence of individuals 
acting together in a collective and organized manner? 
(5) Adverse impact: what is the potential adverse impact on individuals, including 
intrusion in their privacy? 
None of these criteria would, by themselves, necessarily exclude application of the personal 
use exemption.83 Instead, one should look at them in combination to determine whether, on 
the whole, the personal use exemption applies.84 The proposed criteria would afford data 
protection authorities a certain degree of discretion when deciding whether or not to take 
action against a particular processing activity. At the same time, using the identified criteria 
would promote objectivity in this decision-making process.85  
 The Article 29 Working Party also took note of the Commission’s proposal to insert 
the wording “without gainful interest” in article 2(2)d of the Regulation. In this respect it 
considered that 
“WP29 assumes that the reference to ‘gainful interest’ is meant to make it clear that 
the processing of personal data done for the purposes of commercial activity does not 
fall within the exemption. […] WP29 fully accepts the intention of the wording. 
However, there is no doubt that individuals can engage in activity that results in 
                                                          
80 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding 
the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or 
household activities”, 27 February 2013, p. 2, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf (last accessed 16 
February 2015). 
81 Ibid, p. 2. 
82 Ibid, p. 4. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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‘gainful interest’ but can do so in a purely personal capacity. The example [...] where 
an individual sells their unwanted birthday presents on an e-commerce site is an 
obvious example of ‘personal’ gainful interest.”86 
 
c. Legislative scrutiny 
In January 2013, the Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) published its first official report on the proposed Regulation.87 In its report, the 
LIBE Committee proposed striking the words “without any gainful interest” from the 
proposed text of article 2(2). 88  In May 2013, the European Council went even further by 
proposing to also strike the word “exclusively”. 89 In the Council version, the Regulation 
would not apply to the processing of personal data 
“by a natural person (...) in the course of (...) a personal or household activity” 90 
The European Parliament, however, has held on to a more narrow understanding of 
the personal use exemption. In the “compromise text”, released in October 2013, article 
2(2)d reads as follows: 
“(d) by a natural person in the course of an exclusively personal or household activity. 
The exemption shall also apply to a publication of personal data where it can be 
reasonably expected that it will be only accessed by a limited number of persons”91  
                                                          
86 Ibid, p. 8 
87Prior to its first official report, the European Parliament published an external report which also analysed the 
scope of the personal use exemption in the Commission’s proposal. See European Parliament, Directorate-
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Reforming the Data 
Protection Package, IP/A/IMCO/ST/2012-02, PE 492.431, September 2012, at p. 33, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/492431/IPOL-
IMCO_ET%282012%29492431_EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2015).  
88 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2012/0011(COD), Draft Report 
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) 16 January 2013, amendment 79, 
p. 62, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE5
01.927 (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
89 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) - Key issues of Chapters I-IV, 2012/0011 (COD), 10227/13 ADD, 31 
May 2013, p. 37, accessible at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010227%202013%20ADD%201  (last accessed 16 
March 2015). 
90 Id.  
91 See European Parliament, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) Compromise 
amendments on Articles 1-29, 7 October 2013, p. 4, accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_01-
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The European Parliament thus seems to cling to the “indefinite number of people” 
test established by Lindqvist. It also retains the term “exclusively”, which favours a narrow 
understanding of the personal use exemption. To date, the Council has not, however, 
revised its earlier stance.92  
 
d. Evaluation 
In my opinion, the approach advanced by the Council of Europe is the most salient. 
Omitting the word “exclusively” encourages a broader understanding of the personal use 
exemption, thereby already mitigating the risk of overregulation considerably. The Council 
text might still, however, be usefully complemented by the recommendations made by the 
Article 29 Working Party in its 2013 Statement. After all, the criteria proposed by WP29 can 
offer useful guidance when determining whether or not a certain activity may be considered 
as a “personal or household” activity. In other words: the Working Party criteria would help 
to promote legal certainty, while still preserving a much needed degree of flexibility.  
Going one step further, however, one could also consider substituting the wording 
“in the course of a personal or household activity” by “in the context of an individual’s private 
or family” (i.e. the first component of the Lindqvist test). Such a change would clarify that 
any activities related to the development of one’s personal identity or the establishment of 
relationships with others shall in principle fall within the remit of the personal use 
exemption. The WP29 criteria would then simply identify the “tipping point” when 
additional limitations become justified in order to prevent undue interference with the 
rights and interests of others. The following section will present three use cases to explore 
the potential impact of the proposed changes in comparison to current state of play.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf. The same text was adopted again by the European Parliament on 12 March 
2014. 
92 (d) by a natural person (...) in the course of (...) a personal or household activity (last verified 8 August 2015). 
It should be noted, however, that the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS now advocate to retain the word 
“purely” or “exclusively” in order to limit favour narrow interpretation. See Article 29 Working Party, Appendix 
– Core topics in view of the trilogue, 17 June 2015, p. 3, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150617_appendix_core_issues_plenary.pdf and European Data Protection Supervisor, 
Annex to Opinion 3/2015: Comparative table of GDPR texts with EDPS recommendations, 27 July 2015, p. 7, 
accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/201
5/15-07-27_GDPR_Recommendations_Annex_EN.pdf (last accessed 8 August 2015) 
21 
 
5. Use cases  
5.1 Online social networks 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) allow us to engage with potentially unlimited 
audiences. What was previously the prerogative of publishers, companies or "geeks", is now 
at everyone's fingertips. Sadly, the use of OSNs can also bring about serious privacy harms. 
Inadvertent disclosures, breaches of confidence and reputational damage are but a few 
examples of social networking gone wrong.  
 
a. Users as “controllers” 
Every OSN user, at least in theory, acts as a “controller” when processing data about 
others.93 The control exercised by an OSN user in principle extends to any processing 
operations he or she initiates voluntarily (i.e., without solicitation). For example, a company 
that uses an OSN for purposes of product promotion shall be considered a controller 
towards: 
- any personal data that is included on the company’s profile page (including its list 
of “connections” or “friends”); 
- any personal data which the company collects through the OSN (e.g., personal 
attributes of connections); 
- any information about individuals which the company disseminates through the 
OSN.94 
 
b. Implications of Lindqvist 
In Lindqvist, the ECJ put forward two tests to determine whether the personal use 
exception can be applied. First, the processing activity must be carried out “in the course of 
private and family life”. Second, the exception shall not apply where data are published on 
the Internet and made accessible to an indefinite number of people. The first test suggests 
that private OSN users, who make use of an OSN for purposes of social interaction, should in 
principle be able to benefit from the personal use exemption. After all, social interaction is 
                                                          
93 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 70; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 5/2009 on online social 
networking’, WP 163, 12 June 2009, p. 5; R. Wong, “Social networking: a conceptual analysis of a data 
controller”, Communications Law Vol. 14, No. 5, 2009, p. 143 et seq.; N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little 
Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 102 et seq; P. Van 
Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, Computer Law & Security Review 2010, Vol. 26, p. 537-
538; and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing Social 
Networking’, International Law & Management Review 2010, Vol. 6, p. 131 et seq.  
94 See also Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA 
apply?’, 24 May 2013, Version 1.0,  p. 3, accessible at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1600/social-networking-and-online-forums-dpa-guidance.pdf (last accessed 18 
March 2015). 
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an essential component of one’s private or family life.95 The second criterion, however, 
entails that the exemption shall not apply where data are made accessible to an indefinite 
number of people. This implies that certain OSN users will be unable to invoke article 3(2) 
once the data in question passes a certain threshold of accessibility.96 
c. Position of the Article 29 Working Party  
In its 2009 Opinion on social networking, the Article 29 Working Party implied that 
the processing activities of private OSN users are generally covered by the personal use 
exemption.97 Since then, several scholars have argued that in practice there are many 
instances in which the exemption cannot be applied.98 In its 2013 Statement, the Article 29 
Working Party recognized the undesirable consequences of the current state of affairs and 
called for a more nuanced approach: 
“[…] WP29 finds it difficult to accept that the fact that an individual makes his blog or 
her social networking profile available to the world at large is – in itself – a factor that 
means that any processing of personal data done in connection with [sic] necessarily 
falls outside the scope of personal or household processing.  
However, WP29 recognises that making information available to the world at large 
should be an important consideration when assessing whether or not processing is 
being done for personal purposes. However, this should not in itself be considered 
determinative.”99 
d. Evaluation 
In cases where the personal use exemption does not apply, the OSN user in question 
shall in principle be subject to the same requirements as those incumbent upon controllers 
in any other context. This outcome is warranted where organizations are concerned, who 
make use of OSNs to realize their commercial, political or other objectives. This outcome is 
problematic, however, where individuals acting in a private capacity (“private individuals”) 
                                                          
95 B. Van Alsenoy, J. Ballet and A. Kuczerawy, ‘Social networks and web 2.0: are users also bound by data 
protection regulations?’, l.c., p. 74. 
96 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 103. 
97 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking’, l.c., p. 5. The Working 
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if the individual ‘takes an informed decision to extend access beyond self-selected “friends”’. (Id.) 
98 See e.g. P. Van Eecke and M. Truyens, ‘Privacy and Social Networks’, l.c., p. 540; N. Helberger and J. Van 
Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 101 
et seq. and D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing 
Social Networking’, l.c., p. 147 et seq.. 
99 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding 
the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or 
household activities”, l.c., p. 9 
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are concerned. If an OSN user is subject to data protection law, it implies, inter alia, that this 
OSN user is required to ensure: 
(1) legitimacy of processing (article 7); 
(2) transparency of processing (article 10-11); 
(3) respect for the data quality principles such as fairness, proportionality, finality 
and accuracy (article 6); 
(4) that data subjects have the ability to exercise certain rights (article 12 and 14); 
(5) confidentiality and security of processing (article 16-17); 
(6) that, where required, notification to national supervisory authorities is performed 
(article 18). 
 At first glance, it seems as if a number of these requirements could be applied to 
private individuals in a reasonable and proportionate way. For example, many would agree 
that “friends” should refrain from uploading pictures of one and other without their 
approval.100 Or that they should not post inaccurate or harmful statements, regardless of 
whether their profile is set to “private” or not. For other data protection requirements, 
however, there exists a mismatch between legal provisions and OSN practices. For example, 
how does one interpret the requirement of not keeping personal data in identifiable form 
for longer than is necessary (art. 6(1)e) in relation to OSN users? Is it possible to determine a 
reasonable time-span as to how long a user should be allowed to maintain a picture or 
remark relating to another person on his profile page? Should we be requiring individuals to 
make such a determination? Another problematic provision is the controller’s duty to 
inform.101 Should OSN users be required to formally notify their peers of (1) their identities; 
(2) the purposes of the processing of their personal data as well as (3) the (categories of) 
recipients concerned? Or is it sufficient if these things are understood implicitly, as a result 
of prevailing social norms and common OSN practices? 
 The criteria proposed by the Article 29 Working Party in its 2013 Statement could 
lead to a fundamentally different outcome. Individuals engaging in social networking in the 
context of their private lives would be able to benefit from the personal use exemption, 
regardless of the number of recipients involved. While certain forms of OSN use might still 
fall outside the personal use exemption, it is clear that users acting in a private capacity 
would generally be exempt from complying with formal data protection requirements as 
such.  
 
                                                          
100 See also N. Helberger and J. Van Hoboken, ‘Little Brother Is Tagging You – Legal and Policy Implications of 
Amateur Data Controllers’, l.c., p. 104. Others may find it perfectly acceptable (and even enjoyable) to find 
themselves ‘tagged’ unexpectedly in a picture uploaded by a shared contact.  
101 See also D.B. Garrie, M. Duffy-Lewis, R. Wong and R.L. Gillespie, ‘Data Protection: the Challenges Facing 
Social Networking’, l.c., p. 132. 
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5.2 Drones  
a. Civilian use of drones 
Drone use by civilians is on the rise. Judging by the headlines, a drone might soon be 
dispatching your online purchases102, bringing food to your table103, or buzzing around your 
neighbourhood just for fun104. While most Europeans are yet to see drones in action, the 
European Commission insists on the importance enabling the introduction of drones on the 
EU Market.105  On 8 April 2014, the Commission adopted a Communication entitled “A new 
era for aviation - Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft 
systems in a safe and sustainable manner”.106 According to the Communication, the market 
for Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (“RPAs” or “drones”) offers enormous potential for economic 
growth and jobs.107 The absence of an appropriate regulatory framework and the lack of 
harmonization are seen as major obstacles for the development of a European market for 
RPAs.108 The regulatory framework should, of course, take into account the fundamental 
rights of citizens and RPA operators would need to comply with applicable data protection 
provisions.109 
b. Position of the European Data Protection Supervisor  
In November 2014, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued an 
Opinion in response to the Commission’s Communication. As a preliminary observation, the 
EDPS noted that many uses of RPAs will involve processing of personal data: 
“[M]any RPAS that will be introduced on the market will include a video camera device 
with specialised software to process the video feed. This camera device with its 
specialised software may well have capabilities such as high power zoom, facial 
                                                          
102 L. Kelion, “Alibaba begins drone delivery trials in China”, BBC News Technology, 4 February 2015, accessible 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31129804 (last accessed 16 March 2015).  
103 T. Wong, “Drone waiters to plug Singapore's service staff gap”, BBC News Technology, 8 February 2015, 
accessible at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31148450 (last accessed 16 March 2015) 
104  L. Sydell, “As Drones Fly In Cities And Yards, So Do The Complaints”, NPR Blog, 12 May 2014, 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/05/12/311154242/as-drones-fly-in-cities-and-yards-so-do-
the-complaints  
105 European Data Protection Supervisor, “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on “A new era for aviation - 
Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable 
manner””, 26 November 2014, paragraph 5, accessible at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/201
4/14-11-26_Opinion_RPAS_EN.pdf (last accessed 10 February 2015). 
106 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
“A new era for aviation Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a 
safe and sustainable manner”, Brussels, 8 April 2014,  COM(2014) 207 final, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/doc/com%282014%29207_en.pdf  
107 Ibid, p. 3. 
108 Ibid, p. 4. 
109 Ibid, p. 7-8. 
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recognition, behaviour profiling, movement detection, or number plate recognition. RPAS 
could also be equipped with Wi-Fi sensors, microphones and audio recording systems, 
biometric sensors processing biometric data, GPS systems processing the location of the 
person filmed, or systems reading IP addresses of all devices located in a building over 
which the RPAS will fly. Embedded technologies could also include the possibility to track 
devices carrying RFID chips and persons/vehicles wearing them”110 
The EDPS also considered the applicability of Directive 95/46 to the use of RPAs for 
private activities, in particular by hobbyists.111 It concluded that  
“In practice […] RPAS uses by individuals, for private activities will normally be subject to 
Directive 95/46/EC requirements and will rarely benefit from the household exception.”112 
In arriving at this conclusion, the EDPS applied the criteria proposed by the Article 29 
Working Party in its 2013 Statement. Specifically, it reasoned that 
“[…] processing carried out via RPAS might meet several of these criteria and fall out 
of the scope of the household exception. For example, personal data might be 
disseminated to an indefinite number of persons, rather than to a limited community 
of friends, family members or acquaintances. […] In addition, if RPAS were to be used 
for private purposes in public areas, it is likely that many individuals with no personal 
relationship with the pilot will see their data collected or even with the individuals 
accessing the data. The scale and frequency might vary a lot depending on hobbyists 
who could join clubs and associations and sometimes, but not necessarily and 
systematically, act in a collective and organised manner. The last criterion is even 
more relevant since there is an undeniable potential adverse impact on individuals, 
i.e. the intrusion into their privacy.”113 
 The EDPS concluded that the use of RPAs by individuals for private activities would 
“quite frequently” be subject to the requirements of Directive 95/46/EC.114 Of the five 
criteria proposed by the Article 29 Working Party, mainly the second (data subjects involved) 
and fourth (adverse impact) seem to weigh against application of the personal use 
                                                          
110 European Data Protection Supervisor, “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on “A new era for aviation - 
Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable 
manner”, l.c., at paragraph 15. 
111 Ibid, at paragraphs 33 et seq. 
112 Ibid, at paragraph 68. 
113 Ibid, at paragraph 38. 
114 Ibid, at paragraph 39. The EDPS also added that, in any event, the processing of personal data will need to 
comply with other relevant rules in areas such as civil or criminal law, intellectual property, aviation or 
environmental law. (Id.) 
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exemption.115 The two remaining criteria (publicity, scale and concerted action) might be 
relevant in specific cases, but not all. It is not clear from the EDPS opinion whether satisfying 
criteria (2) and (4) alone would be sufficient to hold the personal use exemption 
inapplicable. Will data protection law apply to every hobbyist? Or only if the hobbyist also 
flies it around the neighbourhood on a regular basis? The Ryneš ruling sheds some, albeit 
limited, light on this issue. 
c. Implications of Ryneš 
In Ryneš, the ECJ held that continuous video surveillance of a public space cannot be 
regarded as a “purely personal or household” activity. According to the Court, the 
monitoring of a public space meant that the surveillance system was “directed outwards 
from the private setting” and therefore did not fall within the scope of article 3(2).116 The 
Ryneš ruling thus provides some additional support for the position of the EDPS. After all, as 
soon as a drone is flown outdoors, any sensors attached to the drone will generally be 
directed “outwards from the private setting”. If the drone captures personal data, one could 
argue that its user is automatically subject to the requirements of Directive 95/46. One 
should, however, be cautious not to unduly extend the Ryneš holding. In its reasoning, the 
ECJ made indirect references to (1) the data subjects involved117; (2) the scale and frequency 
of the processing118 and (3) the potential adverse impact on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others119. It is true that the “monitoring of a public space” was a determinative 
element of the ECJ’s holding. Nevertheless, it is clear that that other elements influenced the 
Court’s final holding120 and therefore should not be discounted from future analyses. 
                                                          
115 As the EDPS points out, a drone flying in a public space could significantly interfere with the privacy interests 
of others. And most likely much of the data captured would concern individuals who have no personal 
relationship whatsoever with the pilot. 
116 Court of Justice of the European Union, František Ryneš v. Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, C‑212/13, 11 
December 2014, at paragraph 33. 
117 The ECJ implicitly considered the data subjects involved by taking into account that the camera system also 
partially monitored a public place. 
118 The ECJ made repeated reference the “continuous” nature of the recording. 
119 See paragraph 29 of Ryneš: “Since the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of 
personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be 
interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter […] the second indent of Article 3(2) of 
that directive must be narrowly construed.” While the reference to the EU Charter serves to further the claim 
that article 3(2) should be construed narrowly, it is also suggests of a greater focus on impact or risk in 
determining the scope and meaning of the provisions of Directive 95/46 (as was also the case in the Google 
Spain ruling). 
120 The ECJ clearly qualified its reasoning, e.g. by referring to video surveillance “such as that at issue” in the 
proceedings (paragraph 35). 
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d. Evaluation 
Policymakers around the world are still grappling with the question of how to 
regulate drones.121  In some jurisdictions, specific rules governing drone usage have already 
been adopted.122 In other jurisdictions, pre-existing rules partially or completely restrict 
certain types of drone usage. 123 In the EU, drones capturing personal data must, as a rule, 
comply with Directive 95/46. According to the EDPS, even hobbyists will ordinarily be subject 
to the requirements of Directive 95/46.124 This may come as a surprise to the hobbyist 
playing with his drone in the park on a Sunday afternoon.125 While the EDPS did not state 
that all hobbyists will be subject to data protection law, it did suggest that hobbyists would 
only “rarely” benefit from the personal use exemption. This conclusion is somewhat 
troubling. In my view, it is disproportionate to subject all drone hobbyists to the regulatory 
framework of Directive 95/45.  First, many hobbyists have neither the intention nor desire to 
process the data of individuals, but do so purely on an “incidental” basis. Second, it seems 
excessive to require hobbyists to familiarize themselves with the requirements of Directive 
95/46. A hobbyist should receive easily accessible and understandable guidelines, preferably 
integrated with other relevant legal requirements (e.g., respect no-fly zones, keep your 
drone within sight, do not film over/near other people’s private property without their 
permission, etc.).126 Of course, data protection authorities are ideally positioned to translate 
general requirements of data protection into specific guidance. There is, however, a 
qualitative difference between formally subjecting private individuals to data protection 
norms, versus publishing a list of guidelines for private uses of a particular technology. In the 
first scenario, it is up to every individual to familiarize him or herself with data protection 
law, submit notifications where applicable, negotiate contracts (e.g., if data captured by 
drones is stored in the cloud) and face legal uncertainty. In the second scenario, the 
                                                          
121 See e.g., A. Parker, “The Drones of Chicago: More Hobbyists Hovering as Laws Try To Catch Up”, DNAinfo 
Chicago, 9 September 2014, accessible at http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140909/river-north/drones-of-
chicago-more-hobbyists-hovering-as-laws-try-catch-up (last accessed 16 March 2015) and X., “Drone owners 
register called for by House of Lords”, BBC News Technology, 5 March 2015, accessible at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31735662 (last accessed 16 March 2015) 
122 See e.g. R. De Peyer, “Drones are banned from Royal Parks amid 'fears over impact on wildlife and visitor 
safety'”, London Evening Standard, 16 March 2015, accessible at 
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/drones-banned-from-royal-parks-amid-fears-over-impact-on-
wildlife-and-visitor-safety-10095538.html (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
123  See e.g. KnowBeforeYouFly, “Recreational users”, accessible at http://knowbeforeyoufly.org/for-
recreational-users and www.dronelaw.net (last accessed 16 March 2015).  
124 The same viewpoint was defended by the Belgian Data Protection Authority: Commissie voor de Bescherming van de 
Persoonlijke levenssfeer, Advies nr 32/2015 van 22 juli 2015 betreffende het Ontwerp  van Koninklijk  besluit  met  
betrekking  tot  het  gebruik  van  op  afstand  bestuurde  luchtvaarttuigen in het Belgisch luchtruim (CO-A-2015-
030).http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_32_2015.pdf (last accessed 5 
August 2015). 
125 In the US, drones are already being used by hobbyists  (to take arial photographs, birdwatching or catching a 
glimpse of an outdoor festival) http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140909/river-north/drones-of-chicago-
more-hobbyists-hovering-as-laws-try-catch-up (last accessed 16 March 2015).   
126  See e.g. Academy of Model Aeronautics, “sUAS Flight Safety Guide”, 2014, accessible at 
http://suas.modelaircraft.org/ama/images/sUAS_Safety_Program_web.pdf  (last accessed 16 March 2015).  
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individual is told where the specific limits are and what the consequences are in case of non-
compliance (e.g., liability in tort, administrative penalty).  
Finally, we should also not lose sight of responsibilities which might be bestowed on 
the manufacturers of drones or other stakeholders. In its opinion, the EDPS made three 
recommendations to help ensure compliance, namely (1) generate a public debate by raising 
awareness on the privacy implications of RPAs; (2) support implementation of privacy by 
design by RPA manufactures; and (3) assist controllers with compliance.127 These measures, 
combined with traditional remedies such as tort law, trespass etc. may go a long way in 
curbing inappropriate drone usage without formally subjecting individuals acting in a private 
capacity to the full range of data protection requirements.  
5.3 Google Glass  
a. “Far from dead” 
Project Glass was officially announced by Google in April of 2012.128 Its objective was 
to build a technology which “helps you explore and share your world, putting you back in the 
moment”129. Google Glass is a “wearable”, controllable either through voice commands, a 
touchpad (which is located on the side of the device) and/or smartphone application.130 It 
features a camera, an optical display and, of course, internet connectivity. One of the ideas 
behind Google Glass is to allow users to capture and augment their reality seamlessly. No 
more looking down at your phone to check for incoming messages. No more having to stop 
what you’re doing to take out your camera (or, for that matter, run a Google search).131  
Google Glass is not yet available in retail stores. Initially, the device was only available 
to “Explorers”, which have been described as “a select group of geeks and journalists who 
paid $1,500 for the privilege of being an early adopter”.132 Later, the company began 
organizing public events and actively encouraging application development by third parties. 
Notwithstanding headlines suggesting that Google Glass has been “shut down”, it is 
expected that the device will eventually still become a mass consumer product.133  
                                                          
127 European Data Protection Supervisor, “Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on “A new era for aviation - 
Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems in a safe and sustainable 
manner”, l.c., at paragraphs  56 et seq. 
128 See Glass Almanac, “The History of Google Glass”, accessible at http://glassalmanac.com/history-google-
glass  (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
129  Google Glass, “Google Glass”, 4 April 2012, accessible at 
https://plus.google.com/+GoogleGlass/posts/aKymsANgWBD (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
130 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Glass  
131  Based on S. Brin, “Why Google Glass”,  TED, February 2013, accessible at 
http://www.ted.com/talks/sergey_brin_why_google_glass?language=en (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
132  N. Bilton, “Why Google Glass Broke”, New York Times, 4 February 2015, accessible at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/style/why-google-glass-broke.html?_r=0 (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
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b. Facial recognition 
In May 2013, Google announced that it will not, for the time being, approve any 
application for Google Glass that involves facial recognition: 
“As Google has said for several years, we won’t add facial recognition features to our 
products without having strong privacy protections in place. With that in mind, we 
won’t be approving any facial recognition Glassware at this time.”134 
Just two weeks prior to the announcement, a third-party developer published 
MedRef, which claimed to be “the first app for Google Glass with facial recognition”.135 
MedRef would allow doctors to “create patient folders by voice, add photo and voice notes, 
view previous notes, and also find patient folders by facial recognition”.136 But why stop 
there? While Google professed it would not approve facial recognition apps for the time 
being, this didn’t stop third-party developers. The most well-known example is probably 
“Facial Network”, the US company behind “Nametag”. Nametag  
“can spot a face using Google Glass’ camera, send it wirelessly to a server, compare it 
to millions of records and in seconds return a match complete with a name, additional 
photos and social media profiles.” 137 
Facebook, for its part, has recently sent Facial Network a cease and desist letter to stop it 
from harvesting user data, claiming it violated Facebook’s terms of use.138  
 In 2008, Jonathan Zittrain mused about the implications of apps like Nametag as 
follows:  
“With reputation systems already advising us on what to buy, why not have them also 
help us make the first cut on whom to meet, to date, to befriend? […] These systems 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with Glass”, BBC News Technology, 6 February 2015,  accessible at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
31164840 (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
134  Google Glass, “Glass and Facial Recognition”, 1 June 2013, accessible at 
https://plus.google.com/u/0/+GoogleGlass/posts/fAe5vo4ZEcE (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
135 See Google Glass Apps, “MedRef Google Glass App”, http://glass-apps.org/medref-google-glass-app, last 
accessed 16 March 2015 (note: this is not an “official” Glassware directory). 
136 Id. 
137 See http://www.nametag.ws. Facial Network is hopeful Google will eventually reconsider: “Google has 
announced that facial recognition will not yet be supported for Glass; undoubtedly due to pressure from privacy 
groups but FacialNetwork.com believes that by providing applications with such vast societal benefits, Google 
will eventually reconsider” (Ibid, last accessed 16 March 2015). A companion app, called “Creepshield”, would 
allow you to check if the person in front of you is a registered sex offender. See C. Poladian, “NameTag: Facial 
Recognition App Checks If Your Date Is A Sex Offender But Should You Use It?”, International Business Times, 
14 January 2015, accessible at http://www.ibtimes.com/nametag-facial-recognition-app-checks-if-your-date-
sex-offender-should-you-use-it-1539308 (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
138M. McGee, “NameTag App Creators: We Got a C&D From Facebook”, Glass Almanac, 12 September 2014, 
accessible at http://glassalmanac.com/nametag-app-creators-got-cd-facebook/5876 (last accessed 16 March 
2015). In the meantime, Facebook continues its work on its own “DeepFace” project: See J. Bohannon, 
“Facebook will soon be able to ID you in any photo”, Science Magazine, 5 February 2015, accessible at 
http://news.sciencemag.org/social-sciences/2015/02/facebook-will-soon-be-able-id-you-any-photo.  
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can indicate who has not offered evidence that he or she is safe to meet —as is 
currently solicited by some online dating sites—or it may use Amazon-style matching 
to tell us which of the strangers who have just entered the café is a good match for 
people who have the kinds of friends we do. […] With enough people adopting the 
system, the act of entering a café can be different from one person to the next: for 
some, the patrons may shrink away, burying their heads deeper in their books and 
newspapers. For others, the entire café may perk up upon entrance, not knowing who 
it is but having a lead that this is someone worth knowing. Those who do not 
participate in the scheme at all will be as suspect as brand new buyers or sellers on 
eBay.” 139  
c. Implications of Ryneš and Google Spain 
Lorna Woods has already highlighted the potential implications of the Ryneš ruling 
for Google Glass: 
“If we take the approach that even partial public use of a fixed CCTV system cannot 
benefit from the household exception, still less would a portable, possibly inconspicuous 
device the purpose of which is uncertain. The reasoning seems stronger still if we consider 
the possible onward use of such data – via a website for example […] – taking into 
account the view in Lindqvist.  Here it is less clear to see that the legitimate interests of 
the data controller (i.e. the person using the device to record and store personal data), 
assuming the processing were to be deemed ‘necessary’ to pursue that interest, would 
weigh heavily against a high level of protection for data protection even as between 
individuals.”140 
 In other words: the argument can be made that users of Google Glass will be subject 
to the requirements of Directive 95/46, even when acting in a private capacity. Ryneš does 
not, however, categorically exclude the applicability of the personal use exemption here. 
Other than stealth, taking a picture using Google Glass is not all that different from taking a 
picture with one’s smartphone (especially if Google Glass were to come equipped with a 
shutter sound or camera light). Of course, the act of uploading that same picture to the Web 
or making use of facial recognition software would require separate analysis. 
 When it comes to facial recognition applications, one should also take into account 
the implications of the Google Spain ruling.141 Google Spain supports the premise that the 
providers of such services would be considered as “controllers” within the meaning of 
Directive 95/46/EC. As such, it is up to them to ensure the requirements of the Directive are 
                                                          
139 J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet— And How to Stop It, o.c., p. 219-220.  
140 L. Woods, “Bringing Data Protection Home? The CJEU rules on data protection law and home CCTV”, EU Law 
Analysis Blog, 11 December 2014, accessible at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2014/12/bringing-data-
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complied with. While a “general purpose” search engine might be able to avail itself of 
article 7(f) to engage in the indiscriminate collection of data on the web, a search engine 
dedicated to people searches using facial recognition arguably can’t. Such service providers 
may reasonably be expected to verify compliance with all data protection requirements 
prior to making the service available to the public at large.  
d. Evaluation 
Regulating private uses of Google Glass through data protection law raises significant 
questions of proportionality. First, as with the drone hobbyist, it seems unreasonable to 
expect the average user of Google Glass to apply the analytical framework of Directive 95/46 
on a daily basis.142 Second, alternative regulatory strategies may actually be more effective. 
It is likely that more results will be achieved by bringing enforcement actions against service 
providers that offer privacy-intrusive applications - as opposed to focusing on the users of 
such the technologies. Of course, even if data protection authorities strictly enforce data 
protection requirements against the providers of applications and/or operating systems143, 
certain individuals will still be able to make use of privacy-intrusive technologies. But for this 
scenario, it may be more useful to institute generic provisions in civil and criminal codes 
rather than mandating wholesale application of data protection law. For example, several 
European countries restrict not only the sale but also the use of tools designed to violate 
one’s confidentiality of communications (e.g. mobile spyware).144 Finally, nothing prevents 
the judiciary from taking into account data protection considerations in the further 
development of “privacy torts”145. Through the principles of “privacy by design” and “privacy 
by default”, regulators might well be able to reduce mainstream misuses of personal data. 
For those that persist, simple inserts in the criminal or civil code or the extension of existing 
legal constructs (e.g. tort law, the right to control the use of one’s image, breach of 
confidence, misuse of private information) may be enough to fill the gaps.  
 
                                                          
142 Contra: Opinion of Advocate-General Jääskinen, František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, Case 
C‑212/13, 10 July 2014, at paragraph 66 (“It is illogical to argue that, in order to protect Mr Ryneš’ fundamental 
rights, it is appropriate to leave unapplied an EU directive which is specifically intended to strike a fair balance 
between Mr Ryneš’ rights and the rights of other natural persons, namely, the people affected by the processing 
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143 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices”, WP 202, 27 
February 2013, p. 9 et seq. 
144  See e.g. article 550bis of the Belgian Criminal Code. See also J. Kerkhofs and P. Van Linthout, 
“Cybercriminaliteit doorgelicht”, T. Strafr., 2010/4, p. 185 et seq. 
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accessed 5 August 2015). See also Section 652 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), accessible at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm (last accessed 16 March 2015). 
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6. The role of Data Protection Authorities 
Perhaps the most compelling argument against extending the scope of the personal 
use exemption concerns the need for effective redress. Directive 95/46 requires Member 
States to provide an independent supervisory authority which is dedicated to monitoring 
compliance.146 It also stipulates that every individual should have the right to file a complaint 
if they feel their rights and freedoms are being harmed by personal data processing.147 From 
the perspective of an aggrieved individual, filing a complaint with a national DPA constitutes 
a much lower threshold than the initiation of formal legal proceedings. While the former can 
often be done online, free of charge, the latter is likely to entail considerable legal expense. 
The matter of DPA oversight is an important one, which also raises its own questions 
regarding proportionality. As noted by the Working Party:  
“It is certainly the case that an inappropriate level of scrutiny and regulation of 
natural persons’ personal or household processing activities by DPAs could inhibit 
individuals’ freedom of speech and could in itself constitute a breach of the 
individual’s right to privacy.” 
[…] 
“However, data protection authorities are also experiencing an increasing number 
 of complaints emanating from individuals’ personal use of the internet. A typical 
complaint might be that a pupil has used a social networking site to say post a 
derogatory, inaccurate or hurtful message about a teacher. Currently some data 
protection authorities would reject any complaints about the pupil on the grounds 
that the processing of personal data involved would fall within the personal or 
household processing exemption. Some data protection authorities also take the view 
that other elements of the law – for example those relating to libel or harassment – 
are more appropriate instruments for dealing with issues such as ‘cyber-bullying’. It is 
the case though that some DPAs do – increasingly – take on the role of mediating 
individuals’ internet postings”148 
The fragments quoted above illustrate the difficult choice that lies ahead. On the one 
hand, exempting individuals may leave victims of privacy harms without DPA assistance. On 
the other hand, too much regulatory scrutiny of “private” processing activities would be 
disproportionate. But what if there was a middle ground? Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46 
provides that  
                                                          
146 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding 
the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or 
household activities”, l.c., p. 1 
147 Ibid, p.  3. 
148 Ibid, p. 2 and 3. 
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“Each supervisory authority shall hear claims lodged by any person, or by an 
association representing that person, concerning the protection of his rights and 
freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data.”  
The scope of article 28(4) is extremely broad. It allows DPAs to hear any complaint 
where an individual’s rights and freedoms are affected by the processing of personal data.149 
Of course, the enforcement powers of DPAs are generally confined to processing activities 
which fall within the scope of data protection law. Still, nothing prevents DPAs from acting 
as “ombudsmen” or “mediators” for claims against private individuals. DPAs can also issue 
opinions on their own initiative as to how privacy interests might be safeguarded in relation 
to specific technological developments. DPAs can also play a role regarding education and 
awareness, even if the processing activity formally falls outside the scope of data protection 
law.150 As noted by the Working Party, when considering the relevance of legal remedies 
other than data protection law: 
 “Whilst DPA’s can have no formal role in enforcing these laws, they should – as far as 
is practicable – be prepared advise [sic] individuals as to other sources of redress 
when they are the victims of personal data processing that falls within the scope of 
the personal and household processing exemption. DPA’s should also continue to 
monitor the situation closely and if there is evidence that individuals are going 
unprotected from serious harm, WP29 should be prepared to issue an opinion as to 
how the situation might be rectified. DPA’s should also continue to work with leading 
player in the industry – for example social networking companies and search-engines 
– to make it easier for individuals to have malicious or damaging content taken down 
from the internet.”151 
Data protection authorities will have the power to investigate whether the personal 
use exemption can be applied in particular instance.152 Enforcement by DPAs should not, 
however, extend to individuals using technology in a private capacity.  
  
 
 
  
                                                          
149 Strictly speaking, it is not even necessary that the processing affects the right to privacy or data protection. 
150 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding 
the data protection reform package - Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or 
household activities”, l.c., p. 6 
151 Ibid, p. 7-8. 
152 Ibid, p. 1 and 4-5 
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7. Conclusion  
It is time to broaden the scope of the personal use exemption. Already today, a clear 
mismatch exists between the legal obligations of “controllers” and the online practices of 
individuals. People share, tweet, tag and pin personal data whilst blissfully unaware of the 
strictures of data protection law. Formally applying the requirements of Directive 95/46 to 
these activities by default would be disproportionate. More often than not, it would also be 
impractical and artificial.  
The ECJ has consistently held that Directive 95/46 does not, by itself, unduly restrict 
legitimate uses of technology. While the Directive supports a certain degree of flexibility, it is 
clear that the existing notion of “purely personal or household activities” is overly narrow.  
Absent further derogations, there is a risk that data protection law will unduly interfere with 
individual freedom. In my view, the personal use exemption should simply apply to all 
activities which may reasonably be construed as taking place in the course of an individual’s 
private or family life.153 In addition, an individual should be able to benefit from the personal 
use exemption regardless of the recipients involved.154 Furthermore, while the location or 
direction of a recording device can be a relevant factor, it need not be determinative. 
Instead, the terms “private and family life” should (continue to) be interpreted broadly, 
extending to any activities related to the development of one’s personal identity or the 
establishment of relationships with others.155 Only when the risk of excessive interference in 
the privacy interests of others is evident (e.g., due to the scale or frequency of the 
processing, combined with the recipients and nature of the data), might it be proportionate 
to bring the activities of private individuals within the scope of data protection law. In order 
to promote legal certainty, additional criteria establishing the boundaries of the personal use 
exemption should be anchored in the law.  
The EU institutions are currently in the process of deciding the future of the personal 
use exemption. Overall, the proposed changes seem to be heading in the right direction. The 
criteria proposed by Article 29 Working Party provide useful additional guidance, while at 
the same time supporting a certain degree of flexibility. The Council has proposed to drop 
the word “exclusively”, which would encourage a broader understanding of the personal use 
exemption. Most important of all, however, is the change in mind set. Data protection law is 
not the only instrument which offers protection misuse of personal data. Other legal 
constructs, such as tort law and personality rights, are better suited to regulate conflicts 
                                                          
153 The first part of the “personal use” test promulgated by the ECJ in Lindqvist also refers to “in the course of 
private or family life of individuals” (Case C-101/01, at paragraph 74).  
154 This would effectively require reversing the second part of personal use test advanced by Lindqvist. 
155 The European Court of Human Rights has underlined that it also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with others. (European Court of Human 
Rights, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 25 September 2001, application no. 44787/98, paragraph 56 and 
European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, application no. 13710/88, 
paragraph 29; available at http://www.echr.coe.int). 
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between private individuals. It is up all of us to develop these constructs further, and to 
inform them with data protection considerations as needed. 
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